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PSYCHIATRIC ASSISTANCE FOR 
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS 
PLEADING INSANITY: THE 
MICHIGAN EXPERIENCE 
In Ake v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court ruled that due pro-
cess requires the state to make psychiatric expert assistance 
available to indigent criminal defendants when insanity will be a 
significant factor at trial.1 Despite the directive of Ake, the 
Court did not provide the states with implementation instruc-
tions. The opinion left several critical issues regarding delivery 
of services unsettled or open to conflicting interpretation. Addi-
tionally, the Court did not preclude implementation approaches 
that could seriously impair the utility of access to psychiatric 
assistance for indigent defendants pleading insanity.2 Problems 
remain regarding the standards for adequate expert service and 
sufficient financial support, the use of a threshold test to deter-
1. 470 -U.S. 68, 83 (1985). In Ake, the Court held: 
[W]hen a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of 
the offense is to be a significant factor at the trial, the State must, at a mini-
mum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct 
an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presenta-
tion of the defense. 
Id. at 83. 
For discussions of Ake u. Oklahoma and its implications, see The Supreme Court, 
1984 Term-Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 120 (1985) [hereinafter The Supreme 
Court, 1984 Term]; Note, Expert Seruices and the Indigent Criminal Defendant: The 
Constitutional Mandate of Ake v. Oklahoma, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1326 (1986) [hereinafter 
Note, Expert Seruices); Note, Criminal Procedure: The Constitutional Extent of the 
Adequate Tools of a Defense, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 273 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Adequate 
Tools]; Note, An lndigent's Constitutional Right to Expert Psychiatric Assistance: Ake 
v. Oklahoma, 39 Sw. L.J. 957 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Right to Assistance]; Note, Due 
Process and Psychiatric Assistance: Ake v. Oklahoma, 21 TULSA L.J. 121 (1985) [herein-
after Note, Due Process and Psychiatric Assistance]; Case Comment, Criminal 
Law-The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Protection: A Preliminary Showing of 
Insanity Requires the State to Prouide a Psychiatrist's Assistance, 11 T. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 211 (1985). 
2. 470 U.S. at 83; Note, Expert Seruices, supra note 1, at 1342-62 & nn.113-220; 
Note, Right to Assistance, supra note 1, at 970, 973; Note, Due Process and Psychiatric 
Assistance, supra note 1, at 141-46, 155-56; Sallet, After Hinckley: The Insanity De-
fense Reexamined (Book Review), 94 YALE L.J. 1545, 1550 n.14, 1551 n.18 (1985). 
907 
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mine the need for assistance, limits on a defendant's choice of 
expert, and the nature of the expert's role. 3 
The federal government and many states already provide psy-
chiatric assistance to indigent defendants pleading insanity.• 
Michigan's statutory scheme for delivering this service11 presents 
an opportunity to evaluate an approach that generally favors de-
fendant interests in areas left unresolved by Ake. This Note un-
dertakes that evaluation. Part I summarizes the Ake decision, 
key problem areas, and the research methodology. Part II de-
scribes the Michigan statutory system. Part III evaluates that 
system using data from interviews with legal and psychiatric 
practitioners and considers the consequences of Michigan's ap-
proach to the issues posed by Ake. The evaluation shows that 
Michigan's system places few impediments to an indigent de-
fendant's access to psychiatric expert assistance, yet still avoids 
the program and adjudicatory ill effects that might lead a juris-
diction to impose the restrictions apparently permitted under 
Ake. Structural features of the Michigan system, such as the use 
of the state-supported Center for Forensic Psychiatry to evalu-
ate all defendants declaring an intent to plead insanity, and the 
informal analytic and evaluation processes used by practitioners, 
together focus public resources on a small set of cases and limit 
the adjudicative impact of generally unrestrained access to psy-
chiatric assistance. 
I. ISSUES AND RESEARCH PROGRAM 
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Ake v. Oklahoma 
expanded the package of defense services available to indigent 
defendants,6 the decision did not resolve all delivery of service 
3. See authorities cited supra note 2. 
4. 470 U.S. 68, 78 n.4 (1985); Note, Right to Assistance, supra note 1, at 965-67 & 
nn.71, 74-83 (summarizing cases and statutes). 
5. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a (West Supp. 1987). 
6. In Ake, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985), the Court reviewed the defense services required by 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (requiring state to provide trial transcript when 
necessary for a decision on the merits of an appeal as of right); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 
252 (1959) (prohibiting fee requirement for filing of a notice of appeal of a conviction); 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (assuring assistance of counsel at trial); Doug-
las v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (providing the right to counsel on the first direct 
appeal as of right); and Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) (mandating that counsel's 
assistance must be effective). See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); 
Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (requiring state to pay for blood grouping tests for a 
putative father in a "quasi-criminal" proceeding); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 
771 n.14 (1970) (recognizing the right to effective assistance of counsel). 
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issues with regard to psychiatric assistance in insanity cases. 
The following discussion reviews the key areas that pose uncer-
tainty for implementation of the right established by Ake. It 
then describes the research methodology used to develop data 
about Michigan's system for providing psychiatric assistance. 
A. Ake v. Oklahoma 
The Supreme Court in deciding Ake v. Oklahoma found in the 
Constitution a requirement to provide to indigent defendants a 
service-psychiatric expert assistance when pleading in-
sanity-that many states and the federal government already 
made available through statute and case law. The Court's imple-
mentation instructions did not extend the constitutional right as 
far as possible. Furthermore, the Court's language left uncer-
tainty in several areas. The adequacy of service, the use of 
threshold tests to determine whether a case presents sufficient 
insanity issues to warrant expert assistance, the defendant's 
right to select the expert, and the role of the expert in assisting 
the defense present problems after the Ake decision and will 
serve as the framework for analyzing the data collected for this 
study. 
1. The decision- In 1979, Glen Burton Ake and an accom-
plice entered an occupied home, bound and gagged the father, 
mother, and son, and attempted to rape the twelve-year-old 
daughter. Ake shot and killed the father and mother and 
wounded the children.7 Captured after an ensuing crime spree, 
Ake confessed to the shootings. 8 His behavior at the arraignment 
prompted the judge to have him examined for competency.9 Less 
than six months after the crime, a state _hospital forensic psychi-
atrist testified that Ake was psychotic and that his mental ill-
ness may have begun years previously. 10 The trial court denied 
the defense request for an examination for sanity at the time of 
the crime or for funds to secure an examination.11 
The jury then found Ake guilty on two counts of first degree 
murder and two counts of shooting with intent to kill and sen-
tenced him to death on the murder counts and to 500 years' im-
7. 470 U.S. 68, 88 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 71. 
10. Id. at 71, 86. 
11. Id. at 72. 
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prisonment on each of the other two counts. 12 On appeal, the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Ake's claim that 
as an indigent he had a constitutional right to the services of a 
court-appointed psychiatrist.13 In 1985, the Supreme Court re-
versed, ruling that Oklahoma should have provided Ake with ac-
cess to psychiatric assistance. a 
The Court determined that the trial court's reliance on .its de-
cision in United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 1~ ostensibly deny-
ing indigent defendants access to state-paid psychiatric assis-
tance, was misplaced.16 Decisions since Baldi had expanded 
defendant rights to defense services, and Baldi had not in fact 
limited defendant access to psychiatric services to the extent 
supposed by the Oklahoma courts. Fundamental fairness now 
required a different result. 17 
To decide whether the state must provide psychiatric assis-
tance, the Court applied the three part Mathews v. Eldridge18 
due process test for evaluating the need for additional proce-
dural safeguards. The Mathews test considers the private inter-
est at stake, the burden to the government of providing the ad-
ditional safeguard, and the risk of error without the safeguard.10 
The Court declared "compelling" the private interest of accu-
racy in a proceeding threatening the defendant's life and lib-
erty. 20 Noting that more than forty states and the federal gov-
ernment were able to provide psychiatric assistance to indigent 
defendants pleading insanity, the Court dismissed the financial 
burden and loss of strategic advantage to the state as not sub-
stantial. 21 Finally, the lack of psychiatric assistance for the de-
12. Id. at 73. 
13. Ake v. State, 663 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). 
14. See supra note 1. At a new trial more than six years after the crime, psychiatrists 
testified regarding Ake's mental state at the time of the crime. The jury found Ake le-
gally sane and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. High Court Appellant Found 
Guilty in 2d Trial, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1986, at A15, col. 1 (late ed.). 
15. 344 U.S. 561 (1953). In Ake, the Court rejected Oklahoma's contention that Baldi 
supported the proposition that the defendant does not have a constitutional right to a 
psychiatric examination to determine his sanity at the time of the offense. Instead, the 
Court interpreted Baldi to require no more assistance than the defendant actually re-
ceived in that case where two psychiatrists called by the defense and one called by the 
court all testified. 470 U.S. at 85. 
16. Ake, 470 U.S. at 84-85. 
17. Id. at 76-77, 84-85. 
18. 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see Ake, 470 U.S. at 86-87. 
19. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see Ake, 470 U.S. at 77; The Supreme Court, 1984 
Term, supra note 1, at 132-33; Note, Expert Services, supra note 1, at 1332-33 & nn.41-
51; Note, Due Process and Psychiatric Assistance, supra note 1, at 127-29. 
20. Ake, 470 U.S. at 78. 
21. Id. at 78-79 & n.4 (citing cases and statutes of 41 states). 
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fendant in cases where insanity is likely to be an issue at trial 
could lead to inaccurate results. 22 The Court thus decided that, 
in appropriate cases, the state is constitutionally required to 
provide psychiatric assistance to indigent defendants pleading 
insanity.23 Ake easily qualified for the required assistance.2• The 
Court limited its holding to cases like Ake's, which presented a 
genuine insanity issue, because only those cases raised a risk of 
erroneous adjudication if the state denied psychiatric 
assistance. 211 
2. Implementation issues- Ake v. Oklahoma leaves imple-
mentation to the states and does not resolve several important 
delivery of service issues. 26 Policy choices in these areas can de-
termine the extent to which indigent defendants meaningfully 
participate in the judicial proceeding and realize the benefit of 
the right announced in Ake. 
a. Adequacy of expert service- The Court did not suggest 
standards for assessing the adequacy of psychiatric assistance, 
nor did the Court consider the links between the quality of ser-
vice and program structure and funding. 27 Studies of public de-
fender and appointed counsel programs have shown that un-
derfunding, inexperience, lack of resources for investigation and 
research, and excessive case loads can lead to legal services for 
indigents so inferior as to raise questions of minimum ade-
quacy. 28 Similar problems could plague the delivery of psychiat-
ric services. 
22. Id. at 78-83. 
23. Id. at 74, 83. 
24. Id. at 86-87. 
25. Id. at 82. 
26. Id. at 83; see supra note 2 and infra notes 27-59 and accompanying text. 
27. Note, Due Process and Psychiatric Assistance, supra note 1, at 145-46 & nn.170-
73. 
28. N. LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR 7-24, 56-59 (1982). 
The decision to furnish counsel to the accused in criminal and juvenile cases is a 
matter of federal constitutional right, not simply of grace. Yet, as documented in 
this report, meaningful compliance with the Constitution is often absent due to 
inadequate funding. Indeed, public defender and assigned counsel programs ex-
perience virtually every imaginable kind of financial deficiency. There are 
neither enough lawyers to represent the poor, nor are all the available attorneys 
trained, supervised, assisted by ample support staffs, or sufficiently 
compensated. 
Id. at 56; see Mounts & Wilson, Systems for Providing Indigent Defense: An Introduc-
tion, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 193, 193-201 (1986). 
[T]he government creates and maintains defense systems which place restraints 
on two crucial ingredients of competent representation: the time to handle each 
case competently and the extrinsic resources for an adequate defense. As a result 
of these systemic defects, many indigent defendants are being denied their right 
to effective assistance of counsel. 
Id. at 195; see also Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal 
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Courts already evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, and they might consider applying a parallel analysis to 
psychiatric services. When courts assess defense counsel per-
formance, they determine whether the incompetent performance 
of counsel prejudiced the defendant by creating "a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the re-
sult of the proceeding would have been different."29 If the courts 
applied this standard to state provision of psychiatric assistance, 
then, in all but egregious cases of state interference, the defend-
ant would face the difficult task of proving that better expert 
performance would have probably made a difference to the re-
sult. 30 Furthermore, case-by-case analysis often fails to confront 
broad issues of financial support, organization, and overall qual-
ity. 31 Coupled with the lack of clear performance standards, 
problems such as insufficient funding could prevent state-paid 
psychiatric assistance from satisfying the promise of Ake. 
b. Threshold need test for psychiatric expert assistance-
Under Ake, the defendant must convince the trial court that 
sanity at the time of the crime is "likely to be a significant fac-
tor" in the trial before the state must provide access to psychiat-
ric expert assistance for presenting an insanity defense.32 Unfor-
tunately, imposing a threshold test to establish the need for 
psychiatric assistance presents interpretation and application 
problems that can result in a court's failure to provide the assis-
tance necessary to present an insanity defense effectively at 
trial.33 
Defense Counsel: A New Look After United States v. Decoster, 93 HARV. L. REV. 752, 
776-77 & nn.139-49 (1980). 
29. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). In Strickland, the Court said 
that by reasonable probability it meant that the errors had to "be sufficient to under-
mine confidence in the result." Id. at 694. 
30. Id. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523, 530-33 (11th 
Cir. 1985) (evaluating prejudicial effect of the state not turning over to a psychiatric 
expert evidence that the expert needed to complete an evaluation consistent with the 
requirements of Ake); Note, supra note 28, at 776-78, 781. 
31. Mounts, The Right to Counsel and the Indigent Defense System, 14 N.Y.U. REv. 
L. & Soc. CHANGE 221, 222-23, 234-35 (1986); Note, supra note 28, at 775-79. 
32. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985). The Court stated: "When the defendant 
is able to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely 
to be a significant factor in his defense, the need for the assistance of a psychiatrist is 
readily apparent." Id. at 82-83. Elsewhere, the Court stated the test as "when a defen-
dant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely 
to be a significant factor at trial, the Constitution requires that a State provide access to 
a psychiatrist's assistance on this issue." Id. at 74. 
33. Note, Expert Services, supra note 1, at 1357-62 & nn.190-220; Note, Due Process 
and Psychiatric Assistance, supra note 1, at 141-43. 
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Tests similar to the one endorsed in Ake, such as those em-
ployed by federal courts under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 
have led to inconsistent results. 34 Ake's extreme behavior in 
court, and the testimony of the state experts clearly indicating 
that Ake was mentally ill prior to the crime, made the case a 
relatively easy one for applying the threshold test. Thus, Ake 
does not provide clear precedent that might resolve difficulties 
in this area. 311 The uncertain nature of these preliminary deter-
minations creates a risk of misjudgment and invites appeals. 36 
These appeals can add cost and delay without affecting the final 
outcome of the trial on the insanity issue-the result in Ake. 37 
Ultimately, a threshold need test prevents some defendants 
from obtaining resources necessary to assess and prepare an in-
sanity test. Sometimes the defense has to argue that the defen-
dant has a credible insanity plea just to obtain the resourc~s 
necessary to investigate the legitimacy of the plea. The defense 
might need expert assistance just to complete that task. 38 In a 
close case, the expert is especially critical in evaluating and 
presenting the defense. Yet, in that kind of case, the factual un-
certainty of the defendant's insanity claim increases the likeli-
hood for error in applying the threshold test. 39 
The courts and states may impose the threshold test to try to 
keep defense counsel from wasting time and public funds on 
fishing expeditions for favorable evidence.4° Threshold need 
tests can indeed save time and money, but they also create a risk 
of trial court misjudgment that is difficult to overturn on ap-
34. Decker, Expert Services in the Defense of Criminal Cases: The Constitutional 
and Statutory Rights of Indigents, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 574, 600, 604, 608-14 (1982). At one 
point, the Court used language similar to that of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, re-
quiring provision of expert services to indigents when those services are "necessary for 
an adequate defense." 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(l) (1982), quoted in Ake, 470 U.S. at 80. 
Although the Court may have drawn its test more narrowly than that used in the Crimi-
nal Justice Act of 1964, the Court's language will not avoid the difficulties experienced 
under the Act, nor the problems created by requiring a threshold showing of need for 
assistance. Note, Expert Services, supra note 1, at 1357-58. 
35. See 470 U.S. at 86; Note, Due Process and Psychiatric Assistance, supra note 1, 
at 142. 
36. See authorities cited supra note 33. 
37. See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text. 
38. Margolin & Wagner, The Indigent Criminal Defendant and Defense Services: A 
Search for Constitutional Standards, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 647, 663 (1973); Note, Expert 
Services, supra note 1, at 1361 & n.216; Note, Adequate Tools, supra note 1, at 285-86. 
39. A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 137-38 (1967). 
40. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.2(d), at 488 n.38 (1985). 
"Both courts and legislatures fear that, lacking this fiscal restraint, appointed counsel, if 
given automatic access to experts, would use them for speculative inquiries based on the 
slim hope that helpful evidence might somehow be uncovered." Id.; see Margolin & Wag-
ner, supra note 38, at 663-64 & n.54. 
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peal.41 Such misjudgments could have grievous consequences for 
the defendant. 
c. Selection of the expert- Ake follows many existing pro-
grams and the case law by declining to hold that the indigent 
defendant has a constitutional right to select any expert the de-
fendant wants.•2 This limitation may be based on a fear of ex-
pert-shopping and of the use of blatantly biased d~fense ex-
perts."3 Nevertheless, by not granting the defendant the right to 
pick any qualified expert, the Ake decision allows states to 
str1lcture service delivery systems inimical to the defendant's 
interests.•• 
A state could select the expert for the defendant or limit the 
defendant's choice to a group of experts who might be hostile to 
the insanity defense, or to the defendant's case, or inferior as 
fo.rensic specialists.0 Without clear standards for expert per-
formance, saddling the defendant with this kind of expert would 
seriously damage the defendant's ability to present an effective 
insanity defense."8 This constraint may not raise constitutional 
issues, but it conflicts with Ake's emphasis on enhancing adjudi-
catory accuracy by providing the defendant with the resources 
needed to participate meaningfully in the adjudicatory process. 
d. The role of the expert- The Ake majority described the 
psychiatric expert as a defense consultant who would assist with 
the evaluation, preparation and presentation of the defense-a 
role that fits with that of a partisan expert. •1 The opinion may, 
41. Decker, supra note 34, at 604. 
42. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985); W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 40, 
§ ll.4(a)-(b); Decker, supra note 34, at 611 & n.231; Note, An Indigent Defendant's 
Constitutional Right to a Psychiatric Expert, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 481, 500 (1984). 
43. Note, Expert Services, supra note 1, at 1356 & nn.185-86 (citing Williams v. Mar-
tin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025 (4th Cir. 1980)); Note, Due Process and Psychiatric Assistance, 
supra note 1, at 152-53. 
44. Note, Expert Services, supra note 1, at 1356-57; Note, supra note 42, at 501 & 
nn.139-45. 
45. In Palmer v. State, 486 N.E.2d 477, 481-82 (Ind. 1985), a case decided after Ake, 
the Indiana Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that court-appointed psy-
chiatrists did not understand Indiana's statutory scheme relating to the insanity defense, 
and that this lack of understanding caused prejudice that could have been avoided if the 
trial court had provided the defendant with funds to hire his own expert. The court-
appointed psychiatrists evaluated the defendant as legally sane. The Indiana court im-
plied that the defendant's problem with the experts was based on their conclusions and 
not on their competence. Under Indiana Code § 35-36-2-2, the experts testify after pre-
sentation of prosecution and defense evidence. IND. CoDE ANN. 35-36-2-2 (West 1987). 
The court in the Palmer case viewed this system as providing "a more reliable fact-
finding basis than would a system in which both sides show up for trial with their own 
'hired guns.'" 486 N.E.2d at 482. 
46. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text. 
47. · Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82-83 (1985). 
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however, tolerate a reading that permits limiting the expert's 
role to that of a neutral party directly serving the court. 48 Limit-
ing the expert to a presumably neutral role is inconsistent with 
the Ake opinion and can hurt the defendant.'9 
Ake appears to envision a strong defense role for the expert.110 
This approach raises bias problems regardless of the expert's in-
tegrity and honesty.111 If the prosecution has its own expert, then 
the lay fact finders, who possess no special medical or scientific 
knowledge, must sort through competing expert testimony 
orchestrated by the adversaries-the so-called battle of the ex-
perts. The persuasive skills of the rival experts could dominate 
the fact-finding process.112 
The neutral expert model attempts to solve adequacy 
problems, but is inconsistent with the adversary approach con-
templated in Ake.63 As the Supreme Court noted in Ake, psychi-
atric evaluation and diagnosis are prone to professional disagree-
ment.11• Scientific and extra-scientific factors can lead to subtle 
biasing that undermines reliability and validity.1111 Systems that 
use only allegedly neutral experts present to the fact finder an 
illusion of intellectual neutrality, encourage excessive deference 
to expertise, and place unwarranted power in the experts' 
hands. 118 In closely contested cases, putting an expert with a hos-
tile view of the insanity defense in a structurally neutral role 
could devastate the defense. If that expert testifies that the de-
fendant was legally sane at the time of the offense, the defense 
faces a practically insurmountable hurdle. 117 At best the defense 
could undermine the testimony of the neutral expert, a difficult 
task without expert assistance.118 In jurisdictions that require the 
48. Palmer v. State, 486 N.E.2d 477 (Ind. 1985) (discussed supra note 45); Note, Ex-
pert Services, supra note 1, at 1347 & n.146 (citing cases); Note, Due Process and Psy-
chiatric Assistance, supra note 1, at 144. 
49. Note, Expert Services, supra note 1, at 1346-55 & nn.135-83. 
50. Id. at 1349-50 & nn.153-59. 
51. The Supreme Court, 1984 Term, supra note 1, at 136 & nn.35-39; Note, Due 
Process and Psychiatric Assistance, supra note 1, at 144 & n.164. 
52. L. COLEMAN, THE REIGN OF ERROR. PSYCHIATRY, AUTHORITY AND LAW 1-21, 45, 52-
62 (1984); W. W1NSLADE & J. Ross, THE INSANITY PLEA 3, 10-12, 18-20 (1983); Banks & 
Poythress, The Elements of Persuasion in Expert Testimony, 10 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 
173-74 (1982). 
53. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
54. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985). 
55. Note, Expert Services, supra note 1, at 1351 n.162; Note, Due Process and Psy-
chiatric Assistance, supra note 1, at 152-54 & nn.192-204. 
56. Note, Expert Services, supra note 1, at 1350 & nn.160-61. 
57. Palmer v. State, 486 N.E.2d 477 (Ind. 1985) (discussed supra note 45); Note, Ex-
pert Services, supra note 1, at 1354-55 & nn.172-82. 
58. Note, Expert Services, supra note 1, at 1354 & n.178. 
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defendant to prove legal insanity, the burden would be particu-
larly onerous. In jurisdictions that place the burden of proof of 
sanity on the prosecution, the defendant would still have to dis-
pel a presumption of sanity.119 
B. Research Issues and Methodology 
The implementation issues presented by Ake form the frame-
work for examining Michigan's system of providing psychiatric 
experts to indigent defendants. 60 Interviews with Michigan de-
fense attorneys, prosecutors, and psychiatric experts active in in-
sanity cases provide the data for evaluating Michigan's approach 
to these issues. 61 
The interviewees are recognized by fellow practitioners as 
leaders in the field. 62 The interviews concentrated on a core set 
of issues pertaining to delivery of service.63 During the study, 
questions were modified to allow interviewees to comment on 
initial findings. This procedure facilitated cross-checking of re-
sults and enabled the research to respond to the insights of 
those most familiar with the subject matter.64 The data does not 
59. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 73 (1985); People v. McKeever, 123 Mich. App. 
533, 536, 332 N.W.2d 596, 598 (1983). 
60. See supra notes 27-59 and accompanying text. 
61. ·In-person interviews took place in Washtenaw and Wayne Counties in Southeast-
ern Michigan. Defense attorneys from other parts of Michigan were interviewed by 
phone. Thirteen attorneys, six clinicians specializing in forensic issues, and six court and 
forensic services personnel were interviewed for this study. References to field notes from 
these interviews use a letter code to identify the individuals with a page citation to rele-
vant materials in the field notes. The interview notes are on file with the Journal of Law 
Reform. 
62. Each interviewee was asked to identify attorneys and clinicians who had partici-
pated in insanity defense cases or were considered knowledgeable in the field. Several 
authors of articles on the insanity defense that appeared in Michigan legal publications 
were also interviewed. A list of interviewees is on file with the Journal of Law Reform. 
63. The interviews focused on the following issues: the process for securing criminal 
responsibility evaluations and independent expert assistance; the selection of cases for 
insanity defenses; the cost of service and the availability of funding; the amount of ex-
pert time involved in various kinds of cases; expert witness competency, persuasiveness, 
credibility, and bias; attorney use and abuse of the system; the role of the expert; the 
selection of the expert; the use of threshold tests; trial court discretion in the approval of 
fees; the effect of witness testimony on adjudicatory results; and the effect of the Guilty 
But Mentally Ill verdict as an alternative to the Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity 
verdict. 
64. See J. KATZ, PooR PEOPLE'S LAWYER'S IN TRANSITION app. at 197-218 (1982). The 
methodology section describes a similar process used for analyzing data from open-ended 
interviews and observational field data in a social science study of poverty lawyers in 
Chicago. The flexible research agenda used in this study helps capture the intellectual 
approaches of those who participate in the social process under study and who create the 
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lend itself to quantitative summaries nor definitive assessments 
of the system's overall effectiveness. Rather, it reflects practitio-
ners' views of the psychiatric assistance program. These views 
are critical to behavior within the system and to delivery of ser-
vice to indigent defendants. 
II. MICHIGAN'S STATUTORY SYSTEM 
This section reviews the performance of Michigan's system for 
providing psychiatric expert assistance to indigent defendants 
pleading insanity. First, it outlines the relevant substantive 
criminal law. Then, it describes the statutory system for public 
funding of psychiatric assistance in indigent defendant cases. Fi-
nally, it reports on the overall use and cost of psychiatric 
services. 
A. The Insanity Defense 
In 1975, the Michigan Legislature adopted the Guilty But 
Mentally Ill (GBMI) verdict in response to a highly publicized 
murder committed by a released criminal, who previously had 
been judged legally insane.66 Under the statute, when a defend-
ant raises an insanity defense, the fact finder must determine 
whether the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense 
and whether the mentally ill defendant was criminally responsi-
ble. 66 A defendant is not criminally responsible if, at the time of 
the offense, due to mental illness or mental retardation that per-
son "lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrong-
fulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
social reality the research describes. Id. In the present study, the interviewees know the 
psychiatric assistance system well and are primary actors within that system. Through 
their legal and clinical work, they shape the actual service given to indigent defendants. 
Consequently, their understandings of how the system works are critical to the system. 
Id. For an example of the use and description of a similar methodology for evaluating 
attorneys representing children in divorce custody cases, see Note, Lawyering for the 
Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from 
Divorce, 87 YALE L.J. 1126, 1143-44 nn.76-80 (1978). 
65. See 1975 Mich. Pub. Acts 180 (codified at MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 330.1400a, 
768.29a(2), 768.36 (1979)); Project, Evaluating Michigan's Guilty But Mentally Ill Ver-
dict: An Empirical Study, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 77, 78-85 & nn.7-38 (1982). 
66. Boyle & Baughman, The Mental State of the Accused: Through a Glass Darkly, 
65 MICH. B.J. 78, 80, 82 (1986); Project, supra note 65, at 85-86. 
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ments of law."67 A defendant found mentally ill and not 
criminally responsible receives a Not Guilty by Reason of In-
sanity (NGRI) verdict. A defendant found mentally ill but crim-
inally responsible receives a GBMI verdict.68 When found 
NGRI, the defendant is committed to a state mental institution 
and is to be released when he does not meet the standards for 
civil commitment.69 The GBMI defendant is to receive psychiat-
ric treatment and serve the normal sentence for the offense. 70 
B. Publicly Paid Psychiatric Assistance 
The Michigan statute also established a process for evaluating 
criminal defendants for mental illness and criminal responsibil-
ity and for providing publicly paid psychiatric assistance to indi-
gent felony defendants pleading insanity.71 To have the defen-
dant evaluated for criminal insanity, defense counsel must sub-
mit to the court and the prosecuting attorney, not fewer than 
thirty days before the date set for trial, a written notice of intent 
to assert legal insanity.72 Upon receipt of the notice, the court is 
to order the Center for Forensic Psychiatry (Forensic Center) or 
other qualified person to examine the defendant with regard to 
the insanity claim.73 Indigent defendants can then secure a 
county-paid independent evaluation "by a clinician of his or her 
choice," and that clinician "shall be entitled to receive a reason-
67. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 768.21a (1979). The statute defines mental illness as a "sub-
stantial disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, ca-
pacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life." Id. § 
330.1400a. 
68. Id. §§ 768.21a, 768.36(3). 
69. Project, supra note 65, at 81-82 & nn.22-23. 
70. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 768.36(3) (1979); Project, supra note 65, at 88-90 & 
nn.48-50. 
71. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a (West Supp. 1987). 
72. Id. § 768.20a(l). 
73. Id. § 768.20a(2). The Forensic Center, an organizational unit of the Michigan De-
partment of Mental Health, is a maximum security facility located in Ypsilanti. It was 
established in 1966 to conduct pretrial competency hearings and to process persons 
found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1128 (1979); Boyle & 
Baughman, supra note 66, at 78 & n.7; Project, supra note 65, at 86 n.43. The psychiatric 
clinic of the Recorder's Court of the City of Detroit also performs criminal responsibility 
evaluations. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 768.20a(9)(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1987); DEPARTMENT 
OF MENTAL HEALTH, STATE OF MICH., FORENSIC CENTER YEAR-BY-YEAR SERVICE DEMAND 
SUMMARY (J. Romans ed. 1987) [hereinafter FORENSIC CENTER SERVICE DEMAND SuM-
MARY). Michigan law defines qualified personnel to include personnel of the psychiatric 
clinic of the Recorder's Court of Detroit and those meeting the standards determined by 
the Department of Mental Health. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(9)(a) (West Supp. 
1987). 
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able fee as approved by the court."'• The prosecution may also 
obtain an independent evaluation.711 The statute requires the Fo-
rensic Center and the independent clinician to submit written 
reports to defense counsel and the prosecutor. These reports 
must state the clinical findings, the facts upon which those find-
ings are based and an opinion "on the issue of the defendant's 
insanity at the time the alleged offense was committed and 
whether the defendant was mentally ill or mentally retarded at 
the time the alleged offense was committed. "76 Michigan does 
not employ a threshold need test for psychiatric assistance, the 
defendant can select any qualified clinician to serve as the inde-
pendent expert, and the expert can act as a defense consultant.77 
C. Overall Program Use and Cost 
Few Michigan defendants raise the insanity defense. Even 
fewer receive the NGRI verdict. After the 1975 statutory crea-
tion of the GBMI verdict, the annual number of NGRI verdicts 
dropped from fifty-six in 1975 to thirty-two in 1976 and has not 
gone above eighty-two since.78 These numbers are small com-
pared to the annual number of arrests and the number of crimi-
nal responsibility evaluations completed each year.79 
74. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(3) (West Supp. 1987). Although poverty lines 
provide guidance, no formal income standards for determining indigency exist, and the 
trial court must use its discretion to decide whether a defendant qualifies for publicly 
paid defense services, such as appointed counsel. Interview with Mr. Lloyd Powell, Pub-
lic Defender, Washtenaw County, Mich. (Jan. 22, 1987) [hereinafter Powell interview]. 
Interview notes are on file with the Journal of Law Reform. Neuhard, Free Counsel: A 
Right, Not a Charity, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 109, 109 n.3 (1986) (citing arti-
cles "detailing the virtual impossibility of establishing uniform and simple indigency 
guidelines."). "[C]urrent eligibility criteria are so arbitrary and unworkable that determi-
nation of the availability of free counsel is either pro forma, or, when meaningfully pur-
sued, too costly." Id. at 109. Various estimates indicate that about two-thirds of all fel-
ony defendants will be classified as indigent. Note, Expert Services, supra note 1, at 
1326 n.3. Public defenders are "the primary defense service providers for about 68% of 
the Nation's population." WASHTENAW COUNTY OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER, 1985-86 
ANNUAL REPORT 30 (1986). 
75. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(3) (West Supp. 1987). 
76. Id. § 768.20a(6)(c). 
77. Id. § 768.20a(3). 
78. FORENSIC CENTER SERVICE DEMAND SUMMARY, supra note 73. The annual number 
of GBMI verdicts has remained below 51. Id. 
79. The annual number of criminal responsibility evaluations for the entire State rose 
from 401 in 1976 to 1102 in 1980. From 1981 to 1986, the annual number has ranged 
from a low of 1067 in 1982 to a high of 1389 in 1985. Id. Between 1975 and 1982, the 
number of males arrested ranged from 191,857 to 263,513 annually. Project, supra note 
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In the overwhelming majority of cases resulting in the NGRI 
verdict, the Forensic Center evaluated the defendant as not 
criminally responsible, and; at a bench trial, the prosecution did 
not contest that conclusion.80 The Forensic Center evaluates the 
defendant as not criminally responsible in about ten percent of 
its criminal responsibility evaluations.81 Rarely does the defen-
dant secure the NGRI verdict when he argues the issue at trial 
after the Forensic Center has evaluated the defendant as crimi-
nally responsible.82 
Excluding overhead costs, the Forensic Center spends 
$1,080,000 annually for criminal responsibility evaluation-at an 
average cost of $1,100 per evaluation.83 Complex or contested 
cases require additional effort and public resources. 84 The Fo-
rensic Center does not budget on a per case or per hour basis, so 
the cost of these cases is not readily available.811 
Statewide data on the number of indigent defendants relying 
on public funds to obtain an independent evaluation of legal in-
sanity is not available. 86 Forensic Center clinicians testify for the 
prosecution on the insanity issue in about fifty trials annually.87 
In these cases, they will usually face an independent expert. Not 
all such cases involve indigents; thus, the public will not have 
65, at 107 app. A, Table A, 90 n.53, 92-93 & nn.67-70. See Caplan, Annals of Law: The 
Insanity Defense, THE NEw YORKER, July 2, 1984, at 45, 51, 69. 
[l]n 1978-the latest year for which national data on the insanity defense are 
available-almost a third of American households were touched by crime, and 
forty million people were victims. Ten million suspects were arrested, and about 
three-fifths of them were charged; approximately two-thirds of those pleaded 
guilty. Only sixteen hundred and twenty-five of the defendants successfully 
pleaded insanity-roughly one-tenth of one per cent of the presumed offenders 
who stood trial. 
Id. at 51. Note, Due Process and Psychiatric Assistance, supra note 1, at 146 n.174. 
80. Project, supra note 65, at 94-95, 108 app. A, Tables C & D. 
81. Interview with Dr. Charles Clark, Director of Clinical Services, Forensic Center 
(Feb. 18, 1986) [hereinafter Clark interview]. Not all Forensic Center NGRI recommen-
dations result in NGRI verdicts. In 1979, only 50% of the NGRI recommendations led to 
NGRI verdicts. Since then, the number has been closer to 70%. Id. Interview notes are 
on file with the Journal of Law Reform. 
82. Project, supra note 65, at 97 & nn.110-11, 113 app. A, Table L. 
83. Interview with Mr. Dan Jeromin, Administrative Officer, Forensic Center (Feb. 
13, 1986) [hereinafter Jeromin interview]. Interview notes are on file with the Journal of 
Law Reform. 
84. Clark interview, supra note 81. 
85. Jeromin interview, supra note 83. 
86. Interview with Ms. Marilyn Hall, State Court Administrator's Office (Jan. 22, 
1986) [hereinafter Hall interview]. Interview notes are on file with the Journal of Law 
Reform. 
87. Clark interview, supra note 81. 
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paid for the expert in all fifty cases.88 No data are available indi-
cating how often the defense will receive funds for an indepen-
dent evaluation and then not pursue the insanity issue at trial.89 
As required by statute, Michigan counties provide funds for 
hiring independent psychiatric experts.90 In Washtenaw County, 
funds are allocated to the Public Defender, who maintains a 
budget line for expert services.91 In other counties, defense coun-
sel asks the court to reimburse the doctor.92 Usually, the court 
authorizes a funding level that conforms to a standard fee sched-
ule for expert services. The court then considers additional 
funds as the expert's time commitment increases.93 The willing-
ness of trial courts to grant additional funds varies and can cre-
ate funding problems for defense services.94 
In 1986, the Michigan Supreme Court submitted to the Gover-
nor a budget request for state funding of the trial courts.911 The 
proposal called for $806,056 for witness fees, to include psychiat-
ric experts for indigent defendants. This figure represents the 
total amount spent by all Michigan counties for all defense ex-
pert services, including psychiatric assistance. The dollar 
88. See sup.ra note 74. Although only 36.2% of the GBMI defendants, 23.8% of the 
NGRI defendants, and 27.9% of those evaluated by the Forensic Center and found 
guilty were employed at the time of arrest, one cannot assume that all defendants plead-
ing insanity were indigent. Project, supra note 65, at 95 n.90, 110 app. A, Table G. When 
the defense used an independent expert only, the prosecution matched the independent 
expert with Forensic Center testimony. When the Forensic Center found the defendant 
not criminally responsible, the defense would use that testimony. If the defense did not 
use Forensic Center testimony, the Forensic Center had probably evaluated the defen-
dant as criminally responsible. Id. at 108 app. A, Table D. 
89. See infra text accompanying notes 121-26. 
90. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 768.20a(3) (West Supp. 1987); infra text accompa-
nying notes 97 -98. 
91. Powell interview, supra note 74. The Public Defender has approximately $8,000 
annually available for psychiatric experts. These funds have been adequate in recent 
years. 
92. Attorney J at l; Attorney K at 2; Clinician F at 5. 
93. Attorney E at l; Attorney F at 2-4; Attorney H at 1, 3; Attorney K at 2; Clinician 
A at 11; Clinician E at 1-2; Clinician F at 1, 4-5. 
94. See infra notes 162-80 and accompanying text. 
95. In 1980, the State Legislature passed 1980 Mich. Pub. Acts 438 (codified at MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.9947 (West 1987)), providing for state funding of Michigan's trial 
courts and allowing for state funding of expert witness fees, including the costs of evalu-
ations and trial testimony by independent psychiatric experts participating in insanity 
defense cases. The Legislature has not, however, appropriated funds to implement this 
program of state support for the trial courts. Hall interview, supra note 86; Interview 
with Ms. Barbara Levine, Office of Michigan Assigned Appellate Counsel (Feb. 17, 1986) 
[hereinafter Levine interview]. The Michigan Attorney General has opined that the stat-
ute does not bind the Legislature as far as funding and that the failure to fund the trial 
courts does not compel termination of funding for other courts, such as the 36th Judicial 
District, which is funded by the State. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. 38. 
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amount certainly exceeds the amount the counties spend for 
psychiatric experts used by indigent defendants pleading 
insanity.98 
III. EVALUATION OF THE MICHIGAN SYSTEM 
Michigan generally takes an expansive approach to publicly 
paid psychiatric assistance for the indigent defendant. The in-
terview data indicate few problems in securing assistance, but 
the requirement of Forensic Center evaluation, jury skepticism 
toward the insanity defense, the availability of the GBMI ver-
dict, funding limitations, and the professional concerns of prac-
titioners constrain the impact of the service. The data did not 
show that Michigan's lack of restraint in the issue areas 
presented by Ake v. Oklahoma has resulted in the kinds of 
problems that might cause a state to take a more cautious 
approach. 
A. Availability and Adequacy of Service 
The evaluation looks at the process for making service avail-
able and considers the adequacy of the service delivered. Both 
are crucial for determining program effectiveness. 
1. Availability- The interview data indicate that Michigan 
courts comply with the statutory requirements of referring de-
fendants to the Forensic Center and providing for independe:n.t 
expert assistance at public expense.97 Services are more readily 
available than before the enactment of the federal system under 
the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 when service was only sporadi-
cally available.98 
Defendants may use the expert services system by simply de-
claring an intent to plead insanity, yet only a small percentage 
of those arrested ever enters this system. 99 A screening process 
96. Hall interview, supra note 86. The Recorder's Court of the City of Detroit spent 
$12,600 for psychiatric expert services in 1985 for all purposes, including, but not limited 
to, insanity defense cases. In 1985, psychiatrists appeared in 38 Recorder's Court cases. 
Interview with Mr. George Gish, Court Administrator (Mar. 1986) [hereinafter Gish in-
terview]. Interview notes are on file with the Journal of Law Reform. 
97. Attorney B at l; Attorney H at 1; Attorney K at 2; Attorney M at 1; see supra 
notes 83-93. 
98. Lewin, lndigency-lnformal and Formal Procedures to Provide Partisan Psychi-
atric Assistance to the Poor, 52 lowA L. REV. 458, 485 (1966). 
99. See supra note 79. 
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eliminates cases from the expert services system. This process 
reduces the likelihood that indigent defendants will take advan-
tage of the psychiatric expert assistance program and pointlessly 
increase costs while distorting the fact-finding process. 
a. Defense counsel- Defense counsel faces substantive and 
strategic issues when deciding, in consultation with the defen-
dant, whether to secure expert assistance and pursue an insanity 
defense.10° Counsel's yiew of the key factors in this decisionmak-
ing helps determine the extent to which indigent defendants use 
the psychiatric expert assistance system and the influence of ex-
pert assistance on adjudication. 
Defense counsel will not use independent psychiatrists and 
the insanity defense simply because the state makes these tools 
available.101 The difficult task of winning an NGRI verdict in-
hibits pursuit of insanity pleas. Usually, the defense argues in-
sanity only when the prosecution already has a strong case that 
the defendant committed the criminal act.102 The adverse effects 
of negative Forensic Center evaluations,1°3 the availability of the 
GBMI verdict,10' and negative jury attitudes toward legal in-
sanity,1011 especially given the often violent nature of the crimes 
involved, 108 tend to work against the defendant. Furthermore, an 
insanity plea complicates the work of the defense attorney.107 
Although some public defenders and appointed counsel try these 
cases effectively,1°8 others are not effective, and the added diffi-
culty and time commitment combined with the low probability 
of success further deter the use of insanity pleas. 109 Presentation 
of groundless insanity defenses can jeopardize credibility with 
trial judges, a valuable commodity for effective advocacy, partic-
ularly for defense attorneys who appear regularly before a par-
100. Attorney D at 4; Attorney G at 10. The decision to plead not guilty is personal 
to the defendant, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 40, § 11.6, but the use of insanity as 
an affirmative defense may fall within the scope of defense counsel's control of strategy. 
In Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983), the Court held that appellate counsel may use 
his professional judgment to decide which claims are strong enough to present on appeal 
despite the defendant's desire to pursue other nonfrivolous claims. 
101. Attorney C at 3, 6; Attorney D at 4; Attorney E at 1; Attorney F at 5; Attorney 
G at 7-10; Attorney I at 8-9; Attorney J at 1; Attorney K at 1. 
102. Attorney E at 2; Attorney I at 9. 
103. See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text. 
104. See infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text. 
105. See infra notes 178-83 and accompanying text. 
106. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text. 
107. Attorney F at 5; Clinician F at 5. 
108. Clinician B at 4. 
109. Attorney F at 4 (stating that there is no money in it for counsel); Clinician E at 
3; Clinician F at 1-2, 5. 
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ticular court.11° Consequently, attorney self-interest often dis-
courages insanity pleas. 
Before having a psychiatrist evaluate the defendant, defense 
counsel assesses the case for a potential insanity defense. m De-
fense attorneys say they evaluate the defendant's character, 
mental history and involvement with the mental health commu-
nity, behavior at the time of the crime, and the crime itself, 
before supporting an insanity plea and requesting a Forensic 
Center criminal responsibility evaluation.112 These attorneys 
view themselves as reasonably expert at recognizing the defen-
dant's faking mental disturbances. us Although the defense at-
torneys do not view their appraisals as ultimately valid, they 
rely on them for the initial decision to explore an insanity de-
fense. 114 Defense attorneys recognize their limitations in this 
area, and, when they have sufficient resources available, they 
seek expert evaluation even before referral to the Forensic 
Center.116 
The type of crime and the way it was committed also affect 
the decision to pursue the insanity defense. Usually the defense 
raises insanity in the most serious cases-those involving major 
felonies, major sentencing ramifications, and acts against peo-
ple. us The perceived irrationality of the crime-in terms of its 
impulsiveness, emotionally charged character, and the apparent 
lack of defendant motivation-correlates with NGRI verdicts in 
cases where the Forensic Center has evaluated the defendant as 
criminally responsible.117 Defense attorneys and the psychiatric 
community understand the linkage between NGRI verdicts, the 
character of the crime, and the defendant's prior behavior. They 
110. Attorney B at 1; Attorney F at 2-3; Attorney G at 9; Attorney I at 7 (reporting 
that courts will decline assigning counsel additional cases). 
111. Attorney Cat 3; Attorney D at 4; Attorney G at 1, 7-10; Attorney Kat 1; Clini-
cian Bat 5. 
112. See authorities cited supra note 111. 
113. Attorney G at 8, 10. 
114. See authorities cited supra note 111. 
115. Attorney B at 1, 6; Attorney C at 1-2; Attorney D at 3; Attorney G at 12-13; 
Attorney H at 6; Attorney K at 1, 4; Clinician E at 6; see infra text accompanying notes 
144-46. 
116. Attorney B at 3; Attorney D at 4; Attorney E at 1. Two-thirds of the cases sub-
mitted for Forensic Center evaluation to determine criminal responsibility involve crimes 
against persons. Project, supra note 65, at 112 app. A, Table K. Experience in other 
jurisdictions indicates a different result. "[l]n some jurisdictions offenses like forgery, 
shoplifting, car theft, and other forms of larceny represent the vast majority of crimes of 
which defendants were found not guilty by reason of insanity." Caplan, supra note 79, at 
69. 
117. Clark & Howard, When Courts and Experts Disagree: Discordance Between In-
sanity Recommendations and Adjudications, 9 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 385, 392-93 (1985). 
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may take this linkage into account when selecting cases for in-
sanity defenses, 118 helping to limit the group of cases in which 
insanity is argued and . expert services are used. 
Forensic Center clinicians and other observers do not believe 
that all defense requests for criminal responsibility evaluations 
originate in a sincere desire to explore insanity. They suggest 
that defense attorneys often obtain Forensic Center evaluations 
just to delay the trial or frustrate the prosecution.119 Neverthe-
less, at least one Forensic Center clinician concedes that about 
three-fourths of the criminal responsibility evaluations raise le-
gitimate issues.120 
When the Forensic Center evaluates the defendant as crimi-
nally responsible, defense counsel can advise the defendant to 
abandon the insanity plea, or may request funds for an indepen-
dent evaluation, 121 despite its heavy burden of neutralizing the 
Forensic Center to gain an NGRI verdict. 122 The data do not 
disclose how often the defense drops the insanity plea at this 
stage, but it happens.123 When the defense continues with the 
insanity plea, an independent expert sometimes finds the de-
fendant criminally responsible.124 Under the statute, the prose-
cution receives the expert's report. 126 If counsel goes ahead with 
an insanity defense, the defendant's own expert can become an 
adverse witness. The probability of successfully countering a Fo-
rensic Center clinician's testimony for the prosecution then be-
comes strikingly low,128 effectively discouraging further consider-
ation of an insanity defense. 
Practitioners understand that deciding not to pursue an in-
sanity defense poses issues regarding effective assistance of 
counsel and professional responsibility.127 Courts have declared 
mistrials due to ineffective assistance of counsel upon failure to 
plead or adequately prepare an insanity defense when the de-
fendant's behavior-such as attempted suicide-a finding of in-
competence to stand trial, or evidence of a history of mental ill-
118. Clinician C at 3; see infra note 214. 
119. Attorney G at 9, 11; Attorney I at 9; Clinician A at 1, 9; Clinician B at 5; Clini-
cian D at 2, 6; Judge A at 1. 
120. Clinician B at 5. 
121. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a (West Supp. 1987); People v. Anderson, 
112 Mich. App. 640, 317 N.W.2d 205 (1981); infra note 129; see also infra notes 148-49. 
122. See supra text accompanying note 82. 
123. See infra note 129. 
124. Attorney D at 2. 
125. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 768.20a(6) (West Supp. 1987); see Attorney Fat 4. 
126. See infra note 149. 
127. Attorney A at 5; Attorney E at 2; Attorney I at 7; Attorney M at 4. 
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ness suggested a possibility of legal insanity.128 Defense counsel 
does not have an absolute duty to investigate and pursue an in-
sanity defense in every possible case, and defense attorneys cor-
rectly believe that they can use their professional judgment to 
assess the facts and make a reasoned decision whether to pursue 
the defense. 129 A Forensic Center evaluation of the defendant as 
criminally responsible, for example, supports not taking any fur-
ther action in pursuit of an insanity def ense.130 
Without an absolute duty to have defendants evaluated for 
criminal responsibility, or to pursue the defense beyond a nega-
tive Forensic Center evaluation, counsel can give full weight to 
the factors that argue against pleading insanity. By applying 
these factors, defense counsel plays a central role in removing 
defendants from the expert services system and reserving ser-
vices for a small subset of the defendant population. 
b. Trial courts- The state statute directs the trial court to 
grant a defendant's request for Forensic Center evaluation and 
appointment of an independent expert.131 Interviewees did not 
report any cases where the trial judge denied these requests.132 
128. See People v. McDonnell, 91 Mich. App. 458, 460-61, 283 N.W.2d 773, 774 
(1979) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel was aware of the 
defendant's psychiatric history, including hospitalization, and its bearing on charged of-
fense, but failed to investigate and consider seriously the possibility of an insanity de-
fense); People v. Bryant, 77 Mich. App. 108, 110, 258 N.W.2d 162, 163-64 (1977) (con-
cluding that counsel's failure to arrange for criminal responsibility evaluation was 
inexplicable in light of the defendant's mental history, attempts to commit suicide, and 
initial declaration that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial); People v. 
Tumpkin, 49 Mich. App. 262, 265-67, 212 N.W.2d 38, 39-40 (1973) (finding facts that 
warranted the entry of an insanity plea based on defense counsel's knowledge of the 
defendant's history of instability, attempted suicide, Forensic Center diagnosis of the 
defendant as psychotic, and trial testimony that the defendant was psychotic, had a frag-
ile hold on reality, heard voices, and suffered religious delusions). 
129. People v. Parker, 133 Mich. App. 358, 262-63, 349 N.W.2d 514, 517 (1984) (de-
clining to hold that defense counsel failed to properly prepare an insanity defense when 
the defendant had no history of mental problems, potential lay witnesses testified as to 
the defendant's mental state even though they were not listed in notice of insanity de-
fense, and an expert witness for the defense testified that the defendant was responsible 
for his behavior); People v. Blue, 114 Mich. App. 137, 142-44, 318 N.W.2d 498, 500-01 
(1982) (holding that defense counsel's tactical decision not to assert an insanity defense 
was reasonable based on psychiatric testimony available to the prosecution, including 
Forensic Center reports that the defendant had no substantial mental deficiency after he 
had initially been found incompetent to stand trial); People v. Anderson, 112 Mich. App. 
640, 645-46, 317 N.W.2d 205, 208 (1981) (deciding that defense counsel's decision not to 
pursue an insanity defense was not ineffective assistance of counsel where the Forensic 
Center examination found no past or present signs of mental illness and counsel could 
have concluded "that an insanity defense was not the best tactical choice"). 
130. Anderson, 112 Mich. App. 640, 317 N.W.2d 205; see supra note 129. 
131. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a (West Supp. 1987). 
132. One judge felt he had discretion in this area, but he took the position that fair-
ness to the defendant and defense counsel required him to honor requests for Forensic 
SPRING 1987) Psychiatric Assistance 927 
The State Appellate Defender's Office is unaware of any appeals 
based on judicial unwillingness to approve evaluation at the Fo-
rensic Center or appointment of an independent expert.133 An 
appellate court has, however, considered the issue of whether a 
particular type of expert fits within the statutory description, 134 
and a trial court has denied funds needed to retain a clinician 
with specialized knowledge about a particular syndrome. 1311 Cer-
tain individuals have been excluded from testifying based on the 
trial court's judgment that they lacked the necessary expertise 
in evaluating people for criminal responsibility. 138 Otherwise, the 
appointment of a psychiatric expert is automatic.137 
The trial court has the power to approve the award of a rea-
sonable fee to the independent expert.138 Coupled with funding 
problems faced by some county court systems, 139 judicial discre-
tion regarding the size of the expert's fee affects the quality of 
service. Low fees reduce experts' expenditure of time on a case 
and discourage participation by some top quality experts. 140 
c. The Forensic Center and the evaluation process- The 
Forensic Center evaluates all defendants pleading insanity.141 
Usually, the Forensic Center finds the defendant criminally re-
sponsible.142 In most indigent insanity cases, the Forensic Center 
evaluates the defendant before the defense obtains any evalua-
Center evaluations and authorization of independent experts. Judge A at 2-3. Even the 
one defense attorney who suggested that courts rely on attorney good faith when they 
know the attorney has a decent reputation and apply a higher standard when they do 
not know the attorney did not report any cases where access to the expert was explicitly 
denied. Attorney B at 1. 
133. Attorney I at 1-3. 
134. Attorney L at 1-2. In People v. Dumont, 97 Mich. App. 50, 294 N.W.2d 234 
(1980), the court determined that a neurological examination satisfied the statutory re-
quirement that the public pay for an expert to examine the defendant as to the underly-
ing medical basis for an insanity defense. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 768.20a(3) (West 
Supp. 1987). The court accepted the prosecution's argument that the decision to appoint 
a neurologist was within the discretion of the trial court, but concluded that the trial 
court had abused that discretion. 
135. Attorney K at 2 (complaining that a trial court would not approve additional 
money to bring in an out-of-state expert on Post-Vietnam Stress Syndrome); Attorney L 
at 2 (observing that courts are reluctant to appoint an expert when the defense advances 
a legal theory that is not well recognized in the law). 
136. People v. Hardesty, 139 Mich. App. 124, 133, 362 N.W.2d 787, 792 (1984). 
137. Attorney L at 1-3. 
138. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(3) (West Supp. 1987). 
139. Gish interview, supra note 96. County court systems generally establish a stan-
dard fee schedule for various kinds of expert services. These standard fee schedules can 
act as limits on the expert's fees. Clinician A at 3. 
140. See infra notes 163-76 and accompanying text. 
141. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(2) (West Supp. 1987). 
142. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. 
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tion by an independent expert. 143 Defense attorneys with ade-
quate re~ources follow a different procedure. They obtain an in-
dependent evaluation before referral to the Forensic Center.14' 
Then, the defense receives expert psychiatric advice early in the 
process and can make strategic decisions without declaring an 
intent to enter an insanity plea. In these cases, the Forensic 
Center does not perform the initial evaluation and start a pro-
cess of building a professional consensus that the defendant is 
criminally responsible. 1411 Immediate independent evaluation 
shortens the time between the offense and the evaluation of the 
defendant's state of mind at the time of the offense, reducing 
the possibility that the defendant's behavior will stabilize and 
become less demonstrative of the state of mind needed for an 
insanity defense. 146 , 
Defendants will rarely receive an NGRI verdict when the Fo-
rensic Center has found the defendant criminally responsi-
ble-its typical finding147-even when the independent expert 
finds the defendant not criminally responsible.148 When the in-
dependent expert concurs with the Forensic Center finding, as 
sometimes occurs, the defendant faces an almost fatal problem. 
The prosecution has access to the expert's report, leaving the 
defense with an extremely weak substantive and strategic basis 
for arguing insanity.149 Indeed, once the Forensic Center enters 
143. Attorney D at 2; Attorney F at 5; Attorney J at 1; Attorney K at 1; Attorney M 
at 1. 
144. Attorney Bat 1, 6; Attorney Cat 3; Attorney D at 3; Attorney G at 12-13; Attor-
ney H at 6; Attorney K at 1; Clinician E at 6. 
145. Attorney B at 1-2; Attorney C at 3; Attorney D at 3-4; Attorney H at 6. 
146. Attorney D at 3; Note, Due Process Concerns with Delayed Psychiatric Evalua-
tions and the Insanity Defense: Time ls of the Essence, 64 B.U.L. REV. 861, 871-73 & 
nn.49-60 (1985). 
147. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
148. Clinician A at 2; Clinician B at 2; Clinician F at 3; Blunt & Stock, Guilty But 
Mentally Ill: An Alternative Verdict, 3 BEHAVIORAL Sci. & L. 49, 61-62 (1985); Project, 
supra note 65, at 103-04; see Clark & Howard, supra note 117, at 394. In 1979, the 
Forensic Center evaluated 864 defendants as criminally responsible. Only 14, or.1.63%, 
of these defendants were adjudicated NGRI. Id. at 386. An evaluation of cases in which 
the Center's recommendations varied from adjudicatory results showed that defendants 
evaluated as criminally responsible but adjudicated NGRI "committed offenses which 
were likely to be impulsive, emotionally charged, or without apparent motivation." Id. at 
394. These defendants differed from defendants adjudicated culpable "both in their his-
tory of psychiatric treatment and in the frequency of prior findings of incompetency to 
stand trial." Id. The study did not assess the effect of attorney skill or of defense ex-
perts. Id. These factors surely affect the outcome, but not wholly independently of the 
character of the crime and the defendant's background. Attorney B at 2-3; Project, supra 
note 65, at 97-98. 
149. The defense could use a hy witness, Attorney D at 6, but would still have to 
contend with an adverse evaluation by a clinician initially selected by the defense. Attor-
ney B at 1-2; Clinician E at 5; see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(6) (West Supp. 
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its usual finding of criminal responsibility, the small prospect for 
eventual defense success discourages the defense from seeking 
public funds for an independent expert, particularly in marginal 
cases.1110 The Forensic Center serves as a constant check against 
potential defense exploitation of the insanity defense in qµes-
tionable cases. 
d. Jury attitudes- Jury attitudes also disfavor insanity de-
fenses. Jury hostility toward the insanity defense depresses the 
number of NGRI verdicts,m the use of the insanity defense, and 
the retention of publicly paid psychiatric experts regardless of 
the lack of statutory impediments to the use of these experts. 1112 
Jury skepticism regarding expert witnesses may encourage 
jury members to disregard expert witness testimony. 1113 If the 
jury disregards the experts, the defense has a weak case. Techni-
cally, the prosecution has the burden of persuasion on the issue 
of legal sanity,m but in most insanity cases, the defense has 
conceded that the defendant committed the criminal act, and 
jury attitudes may force the defense to do more than simply of-
fer evidence contrary to that presented by the prosecution. The 
defense may have to get the jury to see the case the way the 
defense expert sees it, and not simply raise a doubt about the 
defendant's criminal responsibility. m Thus, the jury presents a 
formidable hurdle for the defendant and operates as a check on 
the expert witness.1116 This difficulty presents one more obstacle 
1987); People v. Parker, 133 Mich. App. 358, 349 N.W.2d 514 (1984); supra note 129; see 
also supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text. 
150. Clinician E at 4; Clinician F at 5. 
151. Clinician E at 4; Clinician F at 3-4. 
152. Attorney B at 2; Attorney E at 1; Attorney F at 5; Attorney G at 5, 11; Attorney 
H at 3; Attorney I at 5, 9; Attorney K at 3-4; Clinician C at 3; Clinician E at 4; Clinician 
Fat 3-4. 
153. Attorney A at 3-4; Attorney B at 2; Attorney E at 1-2; Clinician C at 2. 
154. People v. McKeever, 133 Mich. App. 533, 536, 332 N.W.2d 596, 598 (1983); 
Boyle & Baughman, supra note 66, at 80. 
155. Attorney G at 5; Attorney K at 3-4; Clinician F at 4; see supra note 152. But see 
Boyle & Baughman, supra note 66, at 85-86. They argue that in People v. Murphy, 416 
Mich. 453, 331 N.W.2d 152, appeal denied, 418 Mich. 956, 344 N.W.2d 6 (1983), the 
court undermined the jury's freedom to disregard expert testimony of insanity when the 
court held that under a sufficiency of the evidence standard, appellate courts can weigh 
the evidence, determine credibility, and find the defendant NGRI when all the experts 
testify that the defendant is not criminally responsible. They object to this alleged usur-
pation of the jury's fact-finding function given the "highly questionable competence" of 
experts to make these determinations. Boyle & Baughman, supra note 66, at 86; see also 
People v. John, 129 Mich. App. 664, 667, 341 N.W.2d 861, 863 (1983) (substituting a 
NGRI verdict for a GBMI verdict where the only two psychiatric experts who partici-
pated testified that the defendant was not legally sane). 
156. Judge A at 1; see also supra notes 151-53. 
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to the objective of obtaining an independent clinician and argu-
ing insanity. 
e. The GBMI verdict- The Michigan Legislature's enact-
ment of the GBMI verdict may have diminished the perceived 
usefulness of the insanity defense. m Although the GBMI verdict 
is not a compromise verdict on the effect of mental illness on 
criminal responsibility, fact finders use it that way,1118 possibly to 
satisfy the desire to keep dangerous criminals off the streets. 1119 
The GBMI verdict further discourages insanity defenses because 
the GBMI sentencing regime sometimes provides no real advan-
tage over a guilty sentence and· may even harm the defendant 
because of greater reluctance to release the defendant. 160 If the 
GBMI verdict reduces the potential benefit of arguing insanity 
at trial, then it may also inhibit the use of independent experts 
because the expert has even less of a chance of persuading the 
fact finder to find the defendant NGRI than when the GBMI 
verdict is not available. 
f. Summary- Even though in some cases defense counsel 
has a clear duty to pursue the insanity defense, counsel retains 
and frequently uses substantial discretion not to refer cases to -
the Forensic Center. When the Center returns a finding of crimi-
nal responsibility, the pressures to continue pursuing the in-
sanity defense diminish. The difficulties faced in presenting and 
winning an insanity defense come into play as defense counsel 
decides whether to prepare and argue an insanity defense. The 
157. Attorney H at 3. Michigan's GBMI verdict has been criticized as ineffective be-
cause it has not accomplished the legislative goals of reducing the number of NGRI ver-
dicts and providing treatment for mentally ill defendants found criminally responsible. 
Project, supra note 65, at 104. Adjudication of the defendant as NGRI has not led to the 
expected medical treatment. Petrella, Benedek, Bank & Packer, Examining the Applica-
tion of the Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict in Michigan, 36 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHI-
ATRY 254, 258 (1985). In contrast, some commentators believe that at least some defen-
dants who are not mentally ill and who might have been erroneously found NGRI, have 
received GBMI verdicts, preventing their premature discharge based on their having 
been found not mentally ill shortly after conviction. Boyle & Baughman, supra note 66, 
at 85. Despite this controversy, the GBMI verdict presents the fact finder with an alter-
native to the NGRI verdict in particular cases. 
158. Attorney G at 6; Attorney I at 2; Clinician A at 2, 7; Clinician E at 5. But see 
Project, supra note 65, at 84 n.33. Commentators and at least two appellate cases have 
raised the issue of abuse of the GBMI verdict by juries that compromise between guilty 
and NGRI by finding the defendant GBMI, but such abuse has not been shown. Id. 
159. Attorney H at 3; Attorney I at 2; Clinician F at 3. 
160. Attorney B at 3; see Blunt & Stock, supra note 148, at 66: "(B]eing found GBMI 
may actually be detrimental since it can interfere with the prisoner's chances of being 
accepted into ancillary programs because of the label of 'mental illness.' " The former 
Executive Director of Michigan Fo•ensic Services reported that many defendants do not 
want mental illness on their records because parole boards may be hesitant to release 
them. Project, supra note 65, at 102 n.134. 
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effect is a radical reduction from the number of cases that could 
enter the system for preparing an insanity defense to the num-
ber that actually enter and fully use the system, and then again 
to the number that result in NGRI verdicts. The reduction pro-
cess eases the demand for public payment for psychiatric expert 
assistance, despite the relatively few restrictions the enacting 
statute places on access to the system. · 
2. Adequacy of service- Michigan does not have formal 
standards for assessing the quality and adequacy of psychiatric · 
expert service.161 Although the data do not point to specific cases 
where inferior service resulted in a clearly erroneous determina-
tion of legal sanity, the data do indicate that limited financial 
support sometimes undermines the utility of the service. 
Problems arise when counties do not allocate sufficient funds 
and when trial courts limit fees, under the "reasonable fee" lan-
guage of the statute, 162 to amounts too low to attract effective 
experts or to secure appropriate expert time. 
The amount paid the independent expert varies by county, 
court, and case. Some counties rely on a standard fee and allow 
the trial court to authorize additional payments. Some courts 
readily grant additional fees on request; others do not.163 In one 
major urban county, the courts will not authorize payments 
greater than those provided under a standard fee schedule un-
less the case requires extraordinary effort.16" Not surprisingly, 
court personnel and psychiatric experts disagree over the appli-
cation of that standard. 1611 
The psychiatric experts take a variety of approaches to setting 
fees in indigent insanity defense cases. They may work for a re-
duced fee, use a fixed fee system instead of their usual practice 
of billing by the hour, or complete the work they think is neces-
sary and then petition for extra money, not knowing whether 
they will receive it. 166 
The standard fee established in several counties-$300 for 
preparation and $150 per day for trial time in Wayne_ County, 
161. The State Appellate Defender's Office, which assists indigent defendants appeal-
ing trial court decisions, has not handled cases raising this issue. Attorney L at 5. 
162. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(3) (West Supp. 1987). 
163. Attorney E at 1; Attorney F at 2-4; Attorney H at 1; Attorney J at 1; Attorney K 
at 2; Attorney L at 5; Clinician A at 3; Clinician E at 1-2; Clinician F at 1, 4-5. 
164. Gish interview, supra note 96. 
165. Attorney F at 2-3; Clinician E at 1-2; 
166. Attorney B at 4; Attorney H at 2; Attorney M at 3; Clinician C at 5; Clinician E 
at 2; Clinician F at 1, 6. 
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for example187-is too low to pay for the number of independent 
expert hours often required to prepare adequately an insanity 
defense. 188 When the defense is unable to get the trial court to 
approve additional fees, the defendant receives inferior services 
unless the expert adjusts only his charges and not his time 
commitment. 
Based on its review of Michigan cases, the Forensic Center 
confirms the view expressed in Ake that a defense expert's assis-
tance can be critical to an insanity defense. The Forensic Center 
found that expert testimony is essential for the defendant to se-
cure an NGRI verdict when the Forensic Center has found the 
defendant criminally responsible.189 An expert's persuasiveness 
influences the outcome170 and depends on such factors as compe-
tence, general expertise, prior experience, and the extent and 
quality of evaluation and preparation for the case.171 Limited 
fees tempt the expert to restrict the preparation of the case to 
the point of impairing the presentation of the insanity 
defense. 172 
Attorneys and clinicians did not describe established stan-
dards for expert time, but they did estimate ranges based on the 
relative difficulty and complexity of the cases' legal insanity is-
sues.173 The simplest cases might require a total of three hours 
167. Interview with Mr. Dan Rutger, Deputy Court Administrator, City of Detroit 
Recorder's Court (Apr. 14, 1987). Interview notes are on file with the Journal of Law 
Reform. 
168. See infra notes 173-75 and accompanying text. 
169. See Clark & Howard, supra note 117; see also Bank & Poythress, supra note 52. 
170. Bank & Poythress, supra note 52, at 174. Jurors interviewed after a highly pub-
licized murder trial where the only defense was insanity indicated that the case rested on 
the experts, but that they found the defense doctor unconvincing, if not offensive. Foren-
sic Center clinicians testified for the prosecution. The jury rejected the insanity defense. 
Cain & Smith, Bailey Faces Life in Prison, Ann Arbor News, Oct. 2, 1986, at Al, col. 4, 
A4, col. 1. Shortly thereafter, the same expert testified for the same defendant at a bench 
trial for a second murder. The trial judge found the defendant guilty of second degree 
murder and then chastised the expert as a publicity seeker. The court called the expert's 
testimony "more theatre than substance." As many as twenty other experts refused to 
take the case. Gave, Bailey Guilty of 2d Murder, Det. News, Nov. 21, 1986, at lB, col. 5. 
171. Attorney B at 4, 6; Attorney C at 3; Attorney G at 3-4; Attorney H at 1; Attor-
ney K at 2; Clinician A at 6, 9-10; Clinician B at 4; Clinician D at 5. 
172. Attorney G at 1-2, 8; Clinician A at 3, 6; Clinician B at 5-7; Clinician D' at 6; 
Clinician F at 5. 
173. The time spent by the expert to prepare and present his evaluation of the de-
fendant will vary with the complexity of the case and the resources available to pay the 
expert. Attorneys and experts provided estimates of the time they would like to have for 
psychiatric assistance and the amount usually needed based on previous experience. 
They had the following comments. 
Although Attorney B has cases that require as little as one hour for evaluation, con-
tested cases can use at least 10 hours of expert time for pretrial preparation. Trial testi-
mony can take a full day. Attorney B at 3-4. According to Attorney C, in some cases the 
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for investigation, report preparation, and consultation with 
counsel. Trial testimony requires additional time. Assuming no 
unanticipated procedural or substantive difficulties, in major, 
complex cases, estimates for time spent outside of court ranged 
from six to twelve hours for evaluation, report preparation, and 
consultation. Some cases require more time. Using eight hours as 
a crude measure of the amount of pretrial time required for ex-
pert services, and a typical fee of $100 per hour,174 the defense 
would need at least $800 jtJ,st for preparation. Restricting the ex-
expert will require up to 20 interview sessions with the defendant. Attorney C at 1-2. 
Attorney D believes that pretrial preparation requires at least six to 10 hours, and trial 
testimony can extend up to five hours. Sometimes the expert needs to spend even more 
time getting ready for trial. Initial interviews just to establish whether the insanity de-
fense has any potential in a particular case will use one hour in addition to the expert's 
travel time incurred when the defendant is incarcerated and the government does not 
allow the expert to interview the defendant at the expert's office. Attorney D at 1, 3-4. In 
a 1986 murder case involving an indigent defendant, Attorney G used 12 hours of expert 
time, but would have preferred 25 or more hours. Attorney G at 1-2. Clinician A noted 
that some cases require only two hours of preparation, whereas others require six. Clini-
cian A at 10. The Forensic Center may put in as little as three hours on some cases, but 
six to eight hours is closer to normal. At least one case required 36-48 hours of Forensic 
Center clinician time. Clinician B at 4-7. Clinician C usually spends six hours preparing a 
case and additional time testifying. Clinician C at 5-6. According to Clinician F, two to 
three hours of work is inadequate. At the time of the interview, he had already put 13 
hours into a vexing murder case and anticipated at least 16 more hours for pretrial prep-
aration. Clinician F at 6. Judge A expects the expert to put at least three to four hours 
into evaluating the defendant. 
174. Psychiatrists typically charge $100-$150 per hour and psychologists $65-$100 per 
hour. Attorney B at 4; Attorney D at 1; Clinician A at 10; Clinician F at 1. There are a 
few forensic psychiatrists who may charge twice the average hourly rate. Clinician F at 1. 
A few experts use a flat fee of $1000 to $1500 when they spend an entire day working on 
an insanity defense case, such as when they must travel to a distant part of the state. 
Attorney D at 2; Clinician F at 1. Some experts reduce their fees for indigent clients. 
Attorney B at 4; Attorney M at 3; Clinician C at 5-6; Clinician E at 1-3. For cases raising 
the insanity defense, some experts charge a fixed fee, even if the defendant is not indi-
gent. Attorney F at 1-2; Clinician C at 5-6. 
According to Attorney B, insanity defense cases typically cost $500-$1000 for the ex-
pert's evaluation and preparation time and $500-$1000 for the expert's time to testify at 
trial. Attorney B at 3-4. Five-figure fees are not uncommon in retained cases. Attorney C 
at 1-2. During the interview, Clinician F estimated that his fee for a pending murder case 
might reach $10,000. Clinician F at 6. Attorney K believes that an expert will need about 
$2000 to do a good job. He recently had a court turn down a request for $1200 to retain a 
psychiatrist with expertise in Post-Vietnam Stress Syndrome. An indigent in Ingham 
County recently received $2500 to pay for psychiatric assistance. Clinician B at 4. Alter-
natively, Judge A thinks that an insanity case can be adequately handled for $500. Judge 
A at 2. Attorney M concurs in this judgment, and argues that the $300 for preparation 
and $150 per day for testimony paid by Wayne County is sufficient, possibly because he 
expects experts to adjust their fees downward for indigent clients. Attorney M at 1, 3. 
Others disagree, directly stating that $300 will not pay for enough time for the expert to 
do an adequate job. Attorney K at 2-3; Clinician B at 5; Clinician C at 5-6; Clinician F at 
5. The examples of the fees charged in particular cases, and consideration of the number 
of hours required by these cases in light of the typical hourly fee charged by experts, 
confirm that assessment. 
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pert to a standard fee of $300, for example, will not pay for an 
adequate amount of service unless the expert drastically modi-
fies his normal billing rates. Some cases will require trial court 
generosity when calculating a reasonable fee. 176 
Low fees and uneven reimbursement practices reinforce other 
factors that limit the available pool of experts.176 Some psychia-
trists do not want to get involved because of their discomfort 
with the courtroom role and the contentious, and sometimes hu-
miliating, character of cross-examination. 177 In some regions of 
Michigan, defense attorneys have trouble finding doctors exper-
ienced enough to present a credible case to the jury.178 Using 
experts from the small group of well-known and generally 
respected defense experts may not solve the problem because 
those experts' reputations as defense doctors are sometimes used 
to discredit them. 179 
The occasional inability to secure the services of competent 
specialists and funding inadequate to support sufficient prepara-
tion can impair the quality of the defense presentation. Certain 
experts, often those with the most experience in forensic psychi-
atry, are more persuasive and skilled at presenting the case to 
the jury. Additionally, preparation is crucial to an effective pre-
sentation.180 The quality of the expert's participation and pre-
sentation of the insanity defense can influence the outcome of 
the case.181 Impediments to expert performance can diminish 
the probability of obtaining an NGRI verdict, although deficien-
cies may not reach the level of incompetence necessary to impli-
cate the prejudice standard used to assess claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.182 Even in Michigan's liberal system, the 
defendant faces built-in financial impediments and judicial re-
strictions that can seriously reduce the quality of service. 
175. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text. 
176. Attorney A at 5; Attorney D at 1; Attorney Eat 4-5; Attorney Fat 1-2; Attorney 
H at 2; Attorney I at 3, 8; Attorney K at 2; Attorney L at 5; Clinician A at 1; Clinician B 
at 5, 7; Clinician C at 6; Clinician D at 5; Clinician E at 1-3; Clinician F at 2. But see 
Attorney M at 1 (having no problems getting the expert he wants for indigent cases). 
177. Attorney E at 4; Clinician E at 1-2; Clinician F at 2. 
178. Attorney K at 2. 
179. Attorney A at 5; Attorney B at 6; Attorney E at 3; Attorney I at 3-4; Attorney K 
at 6. But cf. Attorney C at 3 (finding reputation as defense doctor of little concern). 
180. Attorney B at 4, 6; Attorney C at 2-3; Attorney D at 1, 5; Attorney E at 4; 
Attorney F at 2; Attorney G at 3-4; Attorney H at 1, 2; Attorney I at 8; Attorney K at 2; 
Clinician A at 8; Clinician B at 4-5; Clinician F at 2; see supra notes 169-72 and accom-
panying text. 
181. Attorney G at 3-4; Attornev K at 2; Clinician B at 4-5; Clinician E at 4; Clinician 
Fat 3-4; Banks & Poythress, supra note 52; see supra text accompanying notes 169-72. 
182. Attorney F at 4; see supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
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B. Threshold Need Test for Psychiatric Expert Assistance 
Michigan grants the indigent defendant access to independent 
psychiatric assistance without applying a threshold need test to 
establish that legal sanity is likely to be a legitimate issue at 
trial.183 The absence of such a test eliminates the possibility of 
appeals based on judicial misapplication.184 The defendant 
avoids the denial of access to psychiatric assistance, and the 
state avoids the costs and delays of appeals, which may not 
change the adjudicative result. 1811 
Without a need test, the defense has substantial discretion in 
securing Forensic Center evaluation and the services of an inde-
pendent psychiatric expert. The factors that discourage use of 
the insanity defense and independent experts screen out cases 
just as a threshold need test might186 and do not require direct 
trial court intervention.187 The screening process protects the 
public from unwarranted use of the service and wasteful expen-
diture of public funds. In Washtenaw County, the Public De-
fender's Office uses its own expert witness budget for psychiatric 
assistance without court involvement, 188 assuming responsibility 
for honest use of the money.189 Once again, the defendant does 
not risk an erroneous judicial determination of need, and the 
public does not face the additional cost and delay of appeals 
based on Ake. 
Michigan's system may allow some defendants to use the Fo-
rensic Center and an independent expert where a court would 
not allow access to publicly paid assistance.190 But the financial 
costs must be weighed against the potential litigation costs of an 
appeal and the cost to a defendant of an erroneous need test 
decision.191 These costs are · especially high in cases where the 
psychiatric evaluations might have enabled the defendant to ob-
tain an NGRI verdict or a prosecutorial compromise.192 Forensic 
Center data and information from several counties suggest that 
the costs of providing the service without employing a need test 
183. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a (West Supp. 1987). 
184. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text. 
185. Attorney E at 5-8; Attorney F at 4; Attorney I at 8; Judge A at 3; see supra 
notes 36-41 and accompanying text. 
186. See supra notes 102-26, 143-44, 147-49 & 152-60 and accompanying text. 
187. Attorney B at 4; Attorney C at 2; Clinician A at 7; Judge A at 3-4. 
188. Attorney D at 2, 6. 
189. Judge A at 6-7. 
190. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20. 
191. Attorney I at 5; Judge A at 3-4. 
192. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. 
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have not overwhelmed the public treasury and pale in compari-
son with the nonmonetary interests of the defendant.193 
Liberal access to expert services has little chance of leading to 
NGRI verdicts in fundamentally meritless cases.104 The factors 
that discourage using the expert service system in weak cases 
prevent an NGRI verdict in fabricated insanity defense cases.1911 
Michigan's experience seems to be that NGRI verdicts result ei-
ther when the experts agree or have a good faith disagree-
ment.196 A need test to keep cases away from a jury because of 
fear that defense experts might persuade the jury wrongly to 
find the defendant NGRI embodies an attack on the insanity 
defense itself and an unwillingness to accept the outcomes of the 
fact-finding process.197 
When the defense requests funds beyond the standard fee 
schedules to pursue evaluation and preparation, the trial court 
can subject the request to careful review or rely on the expert's 
and defense counsel's good faith. Some courts appear to use a 
good faith test at this point, a practice that roughly conforms to 
the recommendations of critics of the threshold need test ap-
proach.198 The indigent defendant has had the benefit of at least 
one completely independent psychiatric evaluation, something 
that Ake does not always require. The trial court controls fur-
ther use of public funds, without the danger of completely and 
erroneously depriving the defendant of constitutionally man-
dated access to psychiatric assistance. 
C. Choice of Expert 
Ake permits states to limit the defendant's choice of psychiat-
ric expert, 199 whereas Michigan allows the defendant to supple-
ment the required Forensic Center examination with evaluation 
by any qualified expert at public expense. 200 The free choice of 
193. See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text. 
194. Attorney A at 6; Attorney B at 1; Attorney C at 6; Attorney E at 2-3; Attorney G 
at 7-9; Attorney H at 3; Attorney I at 5, 9; Clinician A at 7-9; Clinician C at 3; Clinician 
E at 4-5; Clinician F at 3, 5-6; see supra notes 102-26, 143-44, 147-49 & 152-60 and 
accompanying text. 
195. See supra note 194. 
196. Clinician A at 7; Clinician B at 7. 
197. L. COLEMAN, supra note 52, at 1-21, 45, 52-64. 
198. Attorney B at 1, 5; Attorney C at 2; Clinician A at 8; Decker, supra note 34, at 
615; Note, Expert Services, supra note 1, at 1360. 
199. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985). 
200. M1cH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(3) (West Supp. 1987). 
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expert balances the influence of the Forensic Center and pro-
tects the defendant in situations where the attitude and skill of 
the defense expert can influence the success of the insanity 
plea.201 
All defendants pleading insanity must undergo Forensic 
Center evaluation, and the Center has the reputation of being 
prosecution oriented.202 Defense attorneys attribute this per-
spective, and possibly the Center's high rate of findings of crimi-
nal responsibility, to such factors as conscious hostility toward 
the defense position, the subtle biasing effects of state employ-
ment, the institutional work environment, or honest scientific 
disposition and perspective. 203 Forensic Center supporters argue 
that Center clinicians are well-experienced in forensic psychiatry 
and careful in their evaluations. They contend that low inci-
dence of not criminally responsible evaluations results from the 
rarity of mental illness in the population and the rigors of the 
insanity test, not from bias. 20" They also point out that Forensic 
Center clinicians are employed by the State Department of 
Mental Health, which is not a prosecuting agency, and that state 
employees, such as the Appellate Defenders, can be strong de-
fense advocates. 2011 
After Forensic Center evaluation, the defense can select any 
qualified experts, including those with reputations as defense-
oriented experts, to complete an independent evaluation.208 Ex-
perts are not equally capable, a potentially significant factor 
when presenting the insanity defense.207 Michigan's program 
does not force a defendant to select the independent expert from 
a set of generally inferior forensic psychiatrists, although fund-
ing limitations might have that effect.208 Judicial hostility to-
ward some psychiatric experts, sometimes manifested through 
201. Attorney B at 6; Attorney C at 2-3; Attorney F at 2; Attorney G at 3-4; Attorney 
Hat I; Attorney I at 8; Attorney Kat 2; Clinician A at 6-7; Clinician Bat 4; Clinician D 
at 5; Clinician E at 1; Clinician F at 1-2; Judge A at 1; see supra text accompanying 
notes 180-82. 
202. Attorney B at 2, 6; Attorney C at 3; Attorney D at 5; Attorney E at 4; Attorney 
K at 1; Attorney M at 2; Clinician A at 2; Clinician C at 1; Clinician D at_ 4; Judge A at 2. 
203. See authorities cited supra note 202. 
204. Attorney E at 3-4; Attorney I at 3-4; Clinician A at 2; Clinician C at 1. 
205. Attorney E at 3-4. 
206. Attorney B at 6; Attorney C at 3; Attorney D at 5; Attorney E at 3-4; Attorney I 
at 3-4; Attorney K at 1-2; Clinician A at 8; Clinician B at 2; Clinician C at 1; Clinician E 
at 5; Judge A at 2; see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(3) (West Supp. 1987); see also 
supra text accompanying notes 204-05. 
207. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21. 
208. See supra text accompanying notes 180-82. 
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reluctance to honor fee requests,209 however, conflicts with the 
statutory preference for free choice of expert. 
The generosity of Michigan's system raises an alternative con-
cern. Does the defendant's ability to seek out a defense-oriented 
expert distort the adjudicatory process by encouraging un-
founded pro-defense evaluations and contributing to patently 
erroneous NGRI acquittals?210 Not surprisingly, defense attor-
neys and experts deny that they distort either the facts of the 
case or the fact-finding process.211 Prosecution interests adopt a 
less generous view of the behavior of defense experts, although 
they admit that the leading defense experts are honest in their 
recommendations and that the defense community generally 
plays things straight. 212 
Several factors constrain expert behavior and protect the fact-
finding process. Defense-oriented experts have recommended 
against an insanity defense because of the results of their evalu-
ations of defendants in addition to strategic grounds.213 Raising 
the insanity defense may link the nature of the crime to the de~ 
fendant's psychiatric history, inflaming jury worries about a 
"maniac" walking the streets. 214 Advocacy of marginal cases 
jeopardizes an expert's credibility, resulting in judicial distrust 
and fee approval problems.2111 Winning becomes an even more 
remote possibility than usual, hurting the expert's track record 
and making defense attorneys wary of using that expert. 216 Sup-
porting weak cases opens the expert to attacks for his pro-de-
209. Clinician F at 4. 
210. Attorney I at 4; Clinician F at 3; see supra note 52 and accompanying text; see 
also Boyle & Baughman, supra note 66, at 81 n.32 (citing a 1978 report claiming that 
80% of those found NGRI are not mentally ill). 
211. Attorney C at 6; Attorney D at 4, 6; Attorney G at 8-11; Clinician E at 4-5; 
Clinician F at 3-4. 
212. Attorney E at 4; Attorney I at 3; Clinician A at 6, 8; Clinician B at 4; Clinician C 
at 4; Clinician D at 3. 
213. Attorney D at 2; Clinician E at 1, 4. 
214. Clinician E at 4-5. This expert considered Ake's case an unlikely one for a suc-
cessful insanity defense based on the nature of the crime. See supra text accompanying 
notes 7-8; see also Clinician F at 3-4. This expert said that in some notorious cases the 
fact finder will want some retribution regardless of the defendant's apparent mental 
problems. With regard to a highly publicized southeastern Michigan case that was in 
progress on the date of the interview-involving the abduction, sexual abuse, and killing 
of a 13-year-old boy by a young man with a history of mental health problems, treat-
ment, and at least one similar offense-this expert viewed the defendant as not having a 
chance of obtaining an NGRI verdict. The defendant was found legally sane. See supra 
note 170. 
215. Attorney B at 1; Attorney I at 7; see supra note 170. 
216. Attorney C at 3; Attorney D at 4; Attorney G at 9; Clinician C at 3-4; Clinician E 
at 5, 6; Clinician F at 3. 
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fense orientation and poor prior performance,217 adding to the 
discomfort of testifying.218 Finally, generally limited fees stifle 
any financial incentive to promote weak cases. 219 
Jury hostility to the insanity defense also constrains the freely 
chosen expert from subverting the fact-finding process. 220 A bla-
tantly pro-defense expert has a small chance of convincing the 
jury to find the defendant not criminally responsible in a weak 
case, especially when opposed by the Forensic Center.221 Al-
though an occasional meritless NGRI verdict may slip 
through,222 prosecutors, defense attorneys, and clinicians all tend 
to see this risk as minimal. 223 Instead, they maintain that the 
insanity defense will only succeed when there is some legitimate 
substantive basis for the defense. 224 
In close cases, the independent expert's pro-defense orienta-
tion works in favor of an NGRI verdict.2211 The prosecution may 
consider an NGRI verdict wrong in some of these cases.228 Yet, 
an NGRI verdict requires the defense to overcome adverse Fo-
rensic Center testimony and convince a skeptical fact finder. 227 
That result demands a credible basis for arguing the defense.228 
These NGRI verdicts hardly amount to gross distortions of the 
fact-finding process, especially in an adversary system.229 
D. Role of the Expert 
The Michigan system permits expert partisanship and only re-
stricts the expert's role by requiring a written evaluation and 
recommendation. 230 Despite fears that partisan experts distort 
the fact-finding process, 231 formal and informal elements of the 
217. Attorney A at 5; Attorney D at 1, 5-6; Attorney Eat 3-4; Attorney I at 2. 
218. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
219. Clinician E at 5; see supra notes 162-68 & 173-75 and accompanying text. 
220. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text. 
221. See supra notes 82 & 151-56 and accompanying text. 
222. Attorney I at 4-5; Clinician A at 8; Clinician Cat 4; see supra notes 210-11 and 
accompanying text. 
223. Attorney Eat 3; Attorney G at 11-12; Attorney H at 3; Attorney I at 4-5; Clini-
cian A at 7; Clinician B at 6; Clinician C at 2-3; Clinician E at 4; Clinician F at 3-5. 
224. Attorney K at l; Clinician A at 7-9; Clinician E at 4; Clinician F at 4-5. 
225. Attorney D at 5; Clinician B at 3; see supra note 148. 
226. Attorney I at 8; Clinician A at 8. 
227. Clinician C at 3; see supra notes 82 & 151-56 and accompanying text. 
228. See supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
229. Clinician A at 8; Clinician Bat 8; Clinician Cat 1-2; see W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, 
supra note 40, § l.6(a)-(c). 
230. See M1cH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(6)(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1987). 
231. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52. 
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Michigan system suppress the influence of expert partisanship 
and prevent experts from leading juries to NGRI verdicts in 
groundless cases. The processes that minimize the impact of free 
choice of expert on adjudicatory result also limit the effects of 
expert partisanship. 232 
The Forensic Center, which many consider prosecution ori-
ented,233 evaluates all defendants pleading insanity.2a. When the 
Center evaluates the defendant as not criminally responsible, 
the prosecutor rarely contests that conclusion, and the issue of 
expert partisanship becomes irrelevant. This covers the vast ma-
jority of NGRI verdicts in Michigan.2311 
In contested cases, the partisan defense expert usually faces a 
Forensic Center clinician. The Center's credibility with judges 
and juries and potential image as a disinterested party,236 bal-
ances the partisanship of the independent expert. In indigent 
cases, limited funding prevents massive battles of the experts 
that might overwhelm the jury. 237 A partisan expert has a great 
deal of trouble overcoming jury skepticism even when the facts 
make the insanity defense highly plausible.238 Although partisan 
experts have probably influenced verdicts favorably for the de-
fendant, outlandish results appear rare. 239 
Participation by partisan experts may add time and cost to 
the trial. Their participation may force the fact finder to sort 
through conflicting testimony from the independent expert and 
the presumably neutral Forensic Center. The Michigan system 
presumes that no single psychiatric expert will necessarily de-
scribe ultimate truth and that the fact-finding process in in-
232. See supra notes 213-21 and accompanying text. 
233. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
234. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(2) (West Supp. 1987). 
235. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
236. See supra note 148. 
237. Caplan, supra note 79, at 51-52. The doctors who testified for the government in 
its case against John Hinckley charged over $300,000. Hinckley's doctors charged about 
one-half of that amount. Id. at 59. "To quiet the popular concern, among psychiatrists as 
much as among others, that doctors have too much sway in insanity trials," bills intro-
duced in the House and Senate after the Hinckley case "proposed to prevent [doctors] 
from testifying about the ultimate question before the jury." Id. at 75; Attorney D at 4 
(noting that attorneys in Washtenaw County Public Defender's Office might use two ex-
perts in a capital case). 
Although FED. R. Evrn. 704(b) has been recently amended to reduce the influence of 
experts over juries, there is still a problem in most insanity cases. The majority of these 
cases are tried at the state level, and there is no indication that Michigan will adopt this 
amended version. Furthermore, expert testimony will remain influential because the ex-
pert can provide evidence that leads to only one ultimate conclusion. 
238. Attorney G at 5; Clinician F at 3; see supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
239. See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text. 
SPRING 1987] Psychiatric Assistance 941 
sanity cases is best served by exposing the fact finder to compet-
ing versions of truth. Apparently, open contests to determine 
that truth have not made judges and juries so vulnerable to ex-
pert manipulation that these contests jeopardize the integrity of 
the adjudicatory process. 
CONCLUSION 
Michigan provides indigent defendants with publicly paid psy-
chiatric assistance without imposing the limitations permitted 
by the Supreme Court's decision in Ake v. Oklahoma. Defend-
ants have access to the system without having to satisfy a 
threshold need test, they can hire any qualified expert they 
want, and the expert may serve as a defense consultant. Several 
factors, however, channel services to appropriate cases and limit 
the adjudicatory impact of Michigan's policy choices. Defense 
attorneys play a critical role in determining whether to use the 
system at all and whether to pursue the insanity defense all the 
way to trial. These attorneys take into account in their decision-
making the multiple factors that make a successful insanity de-
fense unlikely. Additionally, the Forensic Center evaluates every 
defendant who indicates an intent to plead insanity. The Center 
typically finds the defendant criminally responsible, and that 
finding discourages both further defense pursuit of an insanity 
argument and decisions for the defendant by the judge or jury 
when the defendant does challenge the Forensic Center's find-
ings. The screening process engaged in by defense attorneys, the 
Forensic Center, and the fact finder discourage use of all the ele-
ments of support made available by the psychiatric assistance 
system. When a defendant persists with a~ insanity defense, de-
spite the relative lack of merit of that defense, the chances for 
adjudicatory vindication for the defendant appear quite slim. 
Fear of disruption of the adjudicatory process seems unfounded. 
In some situations, funding difficulties prevent the psychiatric 
assistance program from fully satisfying 'the needs of the indi-
gent defendant. The bulk of the State's money goes to support-
ing the Forensic Center. Although the Center evaluates each de-
fendant, the Center does not directly serve defendant interests. 
Instead, the funding for defense experts that comes through 
county governments is inconsistent. Adequate psychiatric expert 
service simply costs more than some counties and courts provide 
in some cases. Michigan has already passed legislation approving 
state funding of trial courts and support services, such as psychi-
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atric experts. Unfortunately, the Legislature has never funded 
this program. Affirmative steps in that direction, providing for 
adequate state funding and administrative controls, would set 
the stage for rectifying implementation problems in Michigan's 
generally successful program for providing psychiatric expert as-
sistance to indigent defendants pleading insanity. 
-Paul Zisla 
